Educated cyclists know that they not only can (legally), but should (for safety) occupy an entire lane when conditions dictate. One of these conditions is when the lane is narrow.

Arizona law is quite strong and plain in this regard. Here is the relevant law, (I intentionally clipped the part about the cyclist’s speed, which is briefly treated later).

§28-815. Riding on roadways… A. A person riding a bicycle…shall ride as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway, except… 4. If the lane in which the person is operating the bicycle is too narrow for a bicycle and a vehicle to travel safely side by side within the lane.

So this law creates a duty in part A for cyclists, but there are enumerated exceptions to this duty, the 4th one being the subject of this article.

We are reminded that from time to time, cyclists are targeted by law enforcement for “taking the lane”. This sometimes takes the form of mis-guided paternalism — “you should always ride to the extreme right so you don’t get hit”. It also can take a an uglier tone of faux-paternalism, really just a thinly-veiled automobile-superiority attitude, the sub-text being “cyclists must always get out of the way of cars”.

And disappointingly sometimes cyclists are found guilty (actually “responsible” is the correct term, I am told) by compliant lower courts.

Happily, Arizona cyclists can point to not one but two relatively recent Superior Court decisions which reversed on appeal these wrongful convictions.

The first case, Arizona V. Goren, occurred in Tempe (Maricopa County). In the second case the rider was riding two abreast, but that isn’t relevant to the case; Arizona V. Piscopo, Pima County (see more generally at Two Abreastness. Also see the case at TBL, the blog of the lawyer who represented Piscopo).

I would encourage everyone to read both of these decisions because they are brief, well-written, and illustrative.

How narrow is narrow?

This can be a gray area; it is not (directly) specified in the law. In Goren, Officer Robinson maintained that 12’10″ (his measurement) was more than ample. He was, however, not aware of the concept of usable space; and thus incorrectly counted the gutter as lane width. In the end, the court accepted that the defendant’s measurement approximately 11′ usable width was both accurate and clearly narrow. Much the same conclusion was reached in Piscopo: “credibility was not at issue and the salient evidence — the dimensions at play — appear undisputed”, the dimension according to the defendant were “no more than 11 feet wide”.

Both cases counted on using the minimum 3′ passing distance specified in §28-735 as an entitlement to the cyclist when determining narrowness. (see Three-Foot Laws for more generally about this law including other states who have a passing-distance law)

From an engineering perspective, the authoritative AAHSTO Guide for the Development of Bicycle Facilities, 1999 says minimum 14′ usable width for side-by-side sharing:

In general, 4.2 m (14 feet) of usable lane width is the recommended width for shared use in a wide curb lane…(the gutter pan should not be included as usable width).

You can play with the dimensions, e.g. if you allow a minimum of 1 foot both to the left of the (8′) motor vehicle, and the right of the (2′) cyclist, plus mandated 3′ between the cyclist and motor vehicle — you come up with something akin to the 14′ mentioned by AAHSTO. Many vehicles are less than 8′, but not by much — and don’t forget to include the mirror width which is commonly not included in specifications. Traffic engineer and cyclist Richard Moeur has created an elegant schematic drawing divvying up the 14′ here.

The Issue of Speed

Neither of the aforementioned cases dealt with whether or not the cyclists were “at less than the normal speed of traffic”. In a nutshell: some courts (but none in Arizona, that i know of) have held that normal means normal for a bicycle. See e.g. State V Patrick , which references the Selz decision; both out of Ohio.

But what about Impeding?

This was not at issue in either of these cases, for some more general discussion of impeding see Bicycles are not Motor Vehicles and Why it Matters.

The Pima County Sheriff’s Office

There is a memo from Lt. K. Woolridge date March 5, 2009 which states the (Pima) county attoney’s position particularly with respect to riding two-abreast. Further inquiries are directed to Seargent Copfer.

Thinking of Representing Yourself?

There are a number of guides for pro se / pro per appellants on the Arizona Supreme Court website.

That bike lane was, however, marked as being “closed” (at least in one direction) and was undergoing construction, with its surface abraded in both directions. The judge, incredibly, suggested that the cyclist should have been riding in the gutter pan, since that was “smooth” — the deputy quickly agreed that this would be great. When questioned about where to ride, the deputy replied “if you’re asking me the way I would ride a bicycle… I would NEVER ride in the lane. Myself, when I ride a bicycle, if there’s 3 INCHES on the right side of the road outside the lane, that’s where I ride my bicycle”.

The deputy’s testimony dripped of the usual false or misguided paternalism; that it’s “too dangerous” to impede traffic, and so forth. This is demonstrably not true, particularly in the circumstances then existing; that is: daylight, urban, low speed roadways. The deputy should have been (monday morning quarterback here; and I doubt it would have impacted the outcome) directly challenged on this testimony.

I’ve written before in Bicycles are not motor vehicles, and why it matters how 28-704A does not apply to bicycles. The judge summarily dismissed this argument; she quoted from 28-812, and quickly concluded that the statute does apply to bicyclists. Thus finding the cyclist responsible for the violation. (she also again brought up the bizarre notion that the defendant could have been riding the gutter pan).

The trial was heard in Flagstaff Justice Court, before the Honorable Cathleen Brown Nichols, Justice of the Peace Pro Tempore.

The cyclist has prepared a stunningly detailed appeal. I wish Justin good luck with it. All cyclists should be very concerned with the outcome.

Story published in The Noise, it’s posted on the author’s blog: City Shenanigans Leave Bicyclists with No Options, covering both the Pryzby and Bus incident.

Be sure to also see this tidbit for more Flagstaff hijinks.

What about legality, though? First, we will consider Arizona state law — The Arizona Revised Statutes (ARS). The short answer is there is no statute prohibiting sidewalk cycling, it is therefore permitted. But the story doesn’t end there because in Arizona, local authorities are granted the authority to regulate all aspects of bicycle operation.

Arizona Revised Statutes

The longer explanation involves dissecting the rights and responsibilities of bicycle riders — §28-812 — which states that cyclists operating on the roadway or shoulder must follow the rules that apply to drivers of vehicles. Sidewalks are not part of the roadway or shoulder, see definitions in §28-601. In contrast, drivers of cars or other vehicles are expressly forbidden from driving on sidewalks, §28-904.

If this seems surprising, it also seemed that way to Arizona Supreme Court Justice Jack D. H. Hays too. Writing with reference to sidewalk cycling in the case of Maxwell v. Gossett (the whole case findings are reproduced below):

I am disturbed by the fact that the legal duties and obligations of persons on bicycles are not defined in the law. Some bicyclists ride with traffic, others ride facing traffic, and of course some ride in the crosswalk. Our statutes give no indication of what is and what is not appropriate.

This case was from 1980, and from what I can tell nothing has changed statutorially, and is still the law of the land.

I should also mention here that bicycles with wheels 16″ or smaller than 16″ — nominally a children’s “toy” bicycle , but also for example folding bicycles with small wheels — are not legally defined as bicycles at all, see definitions §28-101.

Localities

But we’re not done yet! ARS specifically grants the power to local authorities to regulate the operation of bicycles in §28-627 . This means that cities can, and most do, place regulations on the use of sidewalks by cyclists. Since there are dozens of independent cities, I can’t look at each of them but Phoenix is typical. Phoenix’s code is available here, see Chapter 36, Article IX. Highlights are that the direction of travel is not mentioned, cyclists must yield the right-of-way to any pedestrian, and that the city may ban cycling by means of erecting signs. Tempe’s code adds that bicycles must be operated “with traffic” — an unsual (but firmly grounded in safety) restriction, sec. 7-52(c).

Here’s a few more; Flagstaff is allowed unless posted, basically just like Phoenix (for references, see here, and scroll down to sidewalk). Prescott, the city of Prescott, is banned. Conversely, in Prescott Valley, it is allowed unless posted, see here for references to both PV and city of Prescott ordinances.

Conclusion

There is no Arizona state law regulating sidewalk cycling, but cities can and do have their own set of restrictions and requirement. Furthermore, the case of Maxwell v. Gossett reaches the somewhat surprising conclusion that cyclists riding in crosswalks (i.e. the continuation of riding on the sidewalk) have much the same right-of-way as pedestrians.

612 P.2d 1061, 1062

Charles J. MAXWELL, next of friend of Jeffrey Jon Maxwell, Appellee,

v.

Celia Sharon GOSSETT and Thomas G. Gossett, husband and wife, Appellants.

No. 14676

Supreme Court of Arizona,
In Division.

June 2, 1980.

Action was brought for injuries sustained by ten-year-old bicyclist in intersection collision with defendants’ automobile. The Superior Court of Maricopa County, Cause No. C-351976, Rufus C. Coulter, J., instructed the jury on contibutory negligence by a child, but refused defendants’ instructions concerning alleged violation of traffic laws. Defendants appealed from an award of damages for the injuries to the bicyclist. The Supreme Court, Cameron, J., held that the trial court properly refused to give defendents’ requested instructions.

Affirmed.

Hays, J., concurred specially and filed statement

1. There was no causal connection between possibility that ten-year-old boy may have been riding bicycle on wrong side of street and collision with automobile which occurred while he was in crosswalk at intersection; thus, trial court, in action for injuries sustained in the accident, did not err on refusing to instruct jury as to statute requiring that bicycles be ridden on right side of street, since it was immaterial to whether he was negligent while riding his bicycle in crosswalk. A.R.S. § 28-815
2. Safety zone statutes had no application to facts in action for injuries sustained by ten-year-old bicyclist when struck by car while riding in crosswalk. A.R.S. §§ 28­101, subd. 40, 28-602, subds. 2, 2(a, b), 28­831.
3. Statute which applies same traffic laws to bicyclists as to drivers of motor vehicles does not prohibit riding of bicycle in cross-walk. A.R.S. §§ 28-602, subd. 2, 28-812, 28-831.
4. Issue whether ten-year-old boy was negligent in riding bicycle in crosswalk was question of general contributory negligence for which jury was properly instructed, not negligence based on violation of statute which applies same traffic laws to riders of bicycles as it does to drivers of motor vehi-cles. A.R.S. § 28-812.

“R.A.J.I. Negligence 7- Violation of Statute
“If you find that any party to this suit violated any of the following laws, then that party is negligent. You should then determine whether that negligence was a cause of the Plaintiff’s injury.

Ҥ 28-812, A.R.S., Traffic laws apply to persons riding bicycles
“Every person riding a bicycle upon a roadway shall be granted an of the rights and shall be subject to all the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle by this chapter, except as to special regulations in this article, and except as to those provisions of this chapter which by their nature can have no application.

Ҥ 28-101, A.R.S., Definitions
“In this title, unless the context otherwise requires:
“40. ‘Safety-zone’ means the area or space officially set apart within a roadway for the exclusive use of pedestrians and which is protected or is so marked or indicated by adequate signs as to be plainly visible at all times while set apart as a safety zone.

Ҥ 28-831, A.R.S., Driving through safety zone prohibited
“No vehicle shall at any time be driven through or within a safety zone.

Ҥ 28-815 A., A.R.S., Riding on roadways and bicycle paths; prohibition of motor vehicle traffic on bike paths
“Every person operating a bicycle upon a roadway shall ride as near to the right side of the roadway as practicable, exercising due care when passing a standing vehicle or one proceeding in the same direction.”

We will consider the failure to instruct as to each of the statutes cited by defendant.

A.R.S. § 28-815(A)

[1] This statute requires that bicycles must be ridden on the right side of the road or with the traffic. Jeffrey was riding his bicycle in the crosswalk at the intersection. Whether he had been operating the bicycle on the left side, contrary to the statute, before he entered the crosswalk, whether he intended to continue operating his bicycle on the roadway, contrary to statute, after he left the crosswalk, or even whether he intended to ride his bicycle on the. available sidewalk on the north side of 8th Avenue, is immaterial as to whether he was negligent while riding his bicycle in the crosswalk. We agree with the New Mexico Court of Appeals which stated in a similar case:

“The accident occurred at the intersection of Chelwood, a north-south street, and Menaul, an east-west street. The trial court found that decedent was proceeding in a southerly direction on Chelwood at the time of the accident. The Wylie vehicle was traveling in an easterly direction on Menaul. Even if we accept defendants’ contention that decedent was operating his bicycle on the left side of Chelwood in violation of the statutes alluded to, we must uphold the trial court’s finding of absence of contributory negligence.

* * * * * *

” * * * Here the evidence sustains an inference that the collision would not have been avoided even if the decedent had been obeying the statutory mandates relating to traffic flow. The violation of the statutes, if any, did not even cause or contribute to the accident in fact. * *” Wilson v. Wylie, 86 N.M. 9, 12, 518 P.2d 1213, 1216 (1973).

Causation is still a part of the law of negli-gence, Pacht v. Morris, 107 Ariz. 392, 489 P.2d 29 (1971), and we find no causal con-nection between the fact that Jeffrey may have been riding on the left hand side of the street before he stopped at the U-Totem Market and the accident which occurred while he was in the crosswalk at the inter-section.

“In this state, it is reversible error to give an instruction on a legal theory as to which there is not substantial evidence, (citations omitted) and it is equally re-versible error not to give an instruction on a legal theory within the issues of the case which is supported by substantial evidence.” Newman v. Piazza, 6 Ariz. App. 396, 398, 433 P.2d 47, 49 (1967).

The instruction, if given, would have been error.

A.R.S. § 28-831

[2] This statute states “no vehicle shall at any time be driven through or within a safety zone.” By definition, a safety zone is set apart for the exclusive use of pedes-trians, A.R.S. § 28-101(40), and, assuming a bicycle is a vehicle for the purposes of the statute, it would have been equally violative of the statute for either Jeffrey or Mrs. Gossett to drive or ride their vehicles in such a safety zone. Weare not concerned in the instant case with a safety zone, however. Jeffrey was not crossing the street in a safety zone. He was crossing the street in a crosswalk as defined by A.R.S. § 28-602(2)(a) and (b), and the safety zone stat-utes have no applicability to the facts in this matter. We find no error.

A.R.S. § 28-812

[3,4] Finally, defendants contend that by this statute, A.R.S. § 28-812, the automobile traffic laws apply to persons riding bicycles, and that, when read with A.R.S. § 28-831 defining safety zones and A.R.S. § 28-602(2) which defines crosswalks, it is unlawful to ride a bicycle in a crosswalk. We agree that this section generally applies the same traffic laws to riders of bicycles as it does to drivers of motor vehicles. The statute excludes, however, provisions “which by their nature have no application.” We do not read the cited statutes as prohibiting the riding of a bicycle in a crosswalk.

We are aware that teachers and concerned parents regularly instruct their children to dismount and walk their bicycles through the crosswalks or major intersections, and that their children, just as regularly, ignore this sound advice. However, this is a question of general contributory negligence for which the jury was properly instructed. It was not negligence based upon a violation of the statute. We find no error.

We note also that some courts have held that a crosswalk is not a part of the roadway for the purposes of the statute. In a case wherein a minor was hit by an automobile as she was riding her bicycle in an intersection, the Washington Court of Appeals, construing a Washington statute almost identical to ours, has stated:

” * * * Miller contends that at the time of the accident, Kelley Ann was a bicyclist subject to the requirements of the Motor Vehicle Code, RCW 46.61.755; the Crawfords contend that she was a pedestrian. RCW 46.04.400. The instruction directed the jury to determine which law applied. RCW 46.61.755 reads as follows:

Every person riding a bicycle upon a roadway shall be granted all of the rights and shall be subject to all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle by this chapter, except as to special regulations in RCW 46.61.750 through 46.61.780 and except as to those provisions of this chapter which by their nature can have no application.

“This statute does not apply because it governs the rider of a bike in a ‘roadway,’ which is defined as ‘the paved, improved, or proper driving portion of a public highway designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel.’ RCW 46.04.500. A cross walk is not a roadway.” Crawford v Mil1er, 18 Wash.App. 151, 152-53, 566. P.2d 1264, 1265-66 (1977).

Judgment affirmed.

STRUCKMEYER, C. J., concurs.

HAYS, Justice, specially concurring:

I concur in the result. However, I am disturbed by the fact that the legal duties and obligations of persons on bicycles are not defined in the law. Some bicyclists ride with traffic, others ride facing traffic, and of course some ride in the crosswalk. Our statutes give no indication of what is and what is not appropriate. I think this is a matter for the legislature and I hope that they will take the time to determine what should be the rights and the obligations of those who use bicycles in today’s heavy traffic.